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Harrison  was the Bank's chief executive during a 
period of national economic  hardship and financial 
instability:  the early years of his term coincided  with 
the stock market collapse of 1929, the Great Depres- 
sion, and the bank failures that culminated in the bank- 
ing crisis of 1933. In this speech, Harrison advocates 
reforms to strengthen  the  U.S.  banking  system and 
calls for the removal of remaining barriers to interna- 
tional  trade. He argues that domestic financial stability 
in the major trading  nations, along with a reestablished 
system of fixed exchange rates and orderly interna- 
tional payments, is crucial to stabilizing the world 
economy. 
Some Essentials of Monetary 
Stability by George  L.  Harrison 
The subject of  this session of the Academy  — Economic 
Recovery and Monetary Stabilization  — has exhausted 
most of the day. It might easily exhaust most of the 
night.  Being  scheduled  as the last speaker, I shall 
make sure that it does not. 
The morning session was devoted to the domestic 
aspects of these problems; the afternoon session to 
the international aspects. I wish that it were possible 
for me to tie together these two parts of this subject 
and to present to the Academy a complete solution. 
Lacking both the wisdom and the authority to present a 
final program, I want merely to discuss some of the 
basic essentials of monetary stability, as I see them, in 
their relation to recovery and economic stability. 
I think  we will agree that monetary stability is not an 
end in itself. What we desire is to promote and main- 
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tam  a prosperous level of trade and employment. Out 
objective is economic stability, and monetary stability 
is important only as a means to that objective. We all 
know that money itself is not wealth —  we cannot eat it, 
we  cannot  wear it, it will not keep  us warm  (even 
though at times it may burn our pockets!). But we know, 
too, that we live in a money economy,  and that a stable 
mechanism of monetary exchange and a stable mea- 
sure of value are essential to our economic life. 
The importance of international trade 
I am one of those who believe that the world has now 
reached the stage where international trade—the 
movement  of goods from points of surplus to points of 
shortage — is an  important factor  in  maintaining eco- 
nomic stability and in producing a higher standard of 
living not  only for the  world  in general but for this coun- 
try too. It may be true that  a nation can  live within 
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alism must be a lower, not a higher, standard of living. 
In prehistoric time the family unit was  the economic 
unit; the caveman had to content himself with his own 
ability to hunt for his living; he provided as best he 
could for himself; his standard  of living depended 
entirely on his own powers to provide for himself. As 
time went on, as the economic unit grew from the sin- 
gle family to groups of families, or later on, as peoples 
became organized into geographical or political units, 
they too, owing to an inadequate mechanism for trade, 
had to live largely within themselves and to be satisfied 
with what they could grow or make for themselves. 
After centuries of struggle, with the development of 
transportation  and communication to the  point where 
goods and people and opinions can be moved about 
rapidly and cheaply, the world has learned to expect 
and to demand  much  broader opportunities and  a 
much higher standard of living than was possible when 
those facilities were lacking. Improved  methods of  com- 
munication and transportation have not only made the 
opportunities for distribution greater, but the press, the 
telephone, and the radio have stirred the imagination 
and enlivened the desires of peoples everywhere for 
the products of other communities .and other nations. 
People are no longer content to accept only that which 
their own nation affords them any  more than people 
within a nation are satisfied with the produce of their 
own particular  locality. It is true that there has been 
much discussion and even advocacy of the ideal of a 
closed economy. I cannot but  feel,  however, that we are 
still far from taking seriously such a definition of our 
ultimate goal  — that it is a passing phase, an expres- 
sion of the world's discouragement with the tangled 
state of affairs resulting from the war and depression. 
The difficulty of maintaining  international 
monetary stability 
It was as a natural development of the growth of inter- 
national trade, and of  the recognition of the importance 
of international monetary stability as a means to that 
end, that the international  gold standard was devel- 
oped. Our problem today is not that international trade 
is any less essential to the maintenance of a full eco- 
nomic life, but rather that we have been compelled to 
recognize by the events since 1914 that international 
monetary  stability has become far  more difficult to 
maintain than it was during the last century. The war 
disrupted and dislocated previously existing economic 
and monetary arrangements. We have been struggling 
with the consequences ever since. Probably no mone- 
tary system that human ingenuity could devise could 
have withstood economic changes of such  magnitude 
and rapidity as the world  has witnessed since  1914. 
Just when and  how we are to succeed  in  restoring 
some definite workable arrangement is hard to tell. 
Primarily, the specific responsibility for international 
monetary stability rests with governments. The diffi- 
culties cannot  be dealt with by economists working 
under laboratory conditions,  nor by central  bankers 
alone. Rather, the solution of these difficulties depends 
on a whole background of world conditions and on the 
development of a public understanding of the problem 
which will make it possible for governments to act, and 
in  turn discourage governments from doing those 
things  which will threaten the success of action once it 
is taken.  The solution requires a meeting of many 
minds. 
Anyone who has followed the course of international 
negotiations since the war and up to this very moment 
must realize how difficult it is to reach  agreements 
even under the most favorable circumstances. We all 
remember the amount of worry and work, the amount 
of international discussion, and the amount of patience 
and goodwill that went into the effort to reestablish 
international monetary stability in the 10 years after  the 
close of the war.  In the light of that experience, we 
have no reason to hope for a quick and easy solution 
of our present problems. 
The complete  cure is  not to be found  in a single 
international conference, nor in some flash of govern- 
mental wisdom, but in persistent and painstaking 
efforts over a period of time. Our efforts in the 1920s 
temporarily  achieved  their objectives  but failed of a 
permanent solution. The question today is whether we 
can do a better job with these puzzling problems than 
we did in the 1920s. We start with a handicap of failure 
behind us which in certain ways makes our task more 
difficult.  On the other hand, we should have learned 
something from our experiences. 
No meeting of minds on international stability  can be 
expected or desired without a favorable combination of 
circumstances  that will give a reasonable assurance 
that any formal agreement which might be reached will 
have a  fair  prospect of being sustained. At the moment, 
with a large part of the world harassed by grave politi- 
cal  uncertainties,  and many important  governments, 
whose  budgets are already badly out of balance, 
spending more and more borrowed money for neces- 
sary relief and for what I hope are unnecessary mili- 
tary establishments, it is hard just now to foresee any 
very early combination of circumstances that will per- 
mit of definite world currency stabilization by interna- 
tional agreement. We can only hope that there may 
soon develop a quieter and  more cooperative 
atmosphere. 
Already there is a favorable side to the picture. The 
progress of world recovery since the middle of 1932 is 
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make international  monetary stability more feasible. 
During the depression the fall of world prices, the gen- 
eral contraction of production,  and  the decline of 
national  incomes greatly  accentuated the many ele- 
ments of unbalance resulting from the Great War. Each 
nation felt forced  to resort to policies designed to pro- 
tect its internal economy. The result has been a tan- 
gled network of defensive measures such as the 
depreciation of currencies, the arbitrary control of for- 
eign exchanges, and the restrictions of trade through 
embargoes, quotas, clearing agreements, licenses, and 
tariffs. 
All these defensive measures, while different in form, 
were  essentially of the same origin, purpose,  and 
effect. Whether they were necessary or unnecessary, 
the general result was a progressive strangulation of 
international trade, which in turn reacted seriously, in 
many cases, upon domestic trade and employment. At 
the lowest point, the total value of world trade  was only 
one-third that of 1929, and the physical volume of  trade 
had fallen by 25 percent, the largest decline in history. 
On broad economic grounds one might now expect a 
reversal of this process. For just as nations during the 
depression cut themselves off from external deflation- 
ary influences, they ought  in  recovery to seek,  by a 
removal of barriers, to share in the beneficial effects of 
a general trade revival. In other words, nature is now 
on the side of the doctors. 
It is a mistake, however, to suppose that the problem 
will eventually solve itself, even when political condi- 
tions become quieter. There  is much that can and 
should be done to pave the way for effective interna- 
tional stability when  governments determine,  in  the 
light of both the political and the economic situation, 
that the time is ripe to act. 
The value of international monetary standards 
One  of the first things we  may well do is to think 
through and try to dissipate the philosophy of defeat- 
ism which  has  been growing  up with respect to the 
possibility of operating an international monetary stan- 
dard, even in modernized form. We must, I think, fairly 
recognize that there is now a considerable school of 
thought which is frankly skeptical about the desirability 
of a return to the gold standard or to any international 
standard. Their doubt  arises in part from the general 
drift towards national economic autonomy. It is  more 
largely derived,  however, from theoretical considera- 
tions as to the relation between domestic and interna- 
tional stability, and these considerations have led many 
to believe that there is a fatal antagonism between the 
two. 
I think that this belief has grown out of the prewar 
theory  of the gold standard and our experiences of the 
past 20 years. The prewar theory of an  "automatic" 
gold standard  carried the implication,  in its abstract 
logic at least, that economic  disturbance,  wherever 
originating or whatever its nature, could be dissipated 
and corrected by the flow of gold. There was a sound 
core of truth in this view, but it also contained the dan- 
gerous suggestion that all a country had to do was to 
adopt the international standard and fold its hands in 
the confident expectation that that beneficent system 
would protect it from all economic ills. 
That there were shortcomings in the gold standard, 
as we have known it in the past, no one now questions. 
But it was not the gold standard per se that failed us 
after the war. World recovery was never soundly rees- 
tablished.  The reparations  question, despite all that 
was done to effect a settlement, refused to be.settled. 
War debts remained a source of disturbance. The  eco- 
nomic position of a number of the countries of Central 
Europe was never really adjusted. The rates of stabili- 
zation of some countries, such  as England for instance, 
were such as to require a greater economic readjust- 
ment in those countries than could easily be achieved 
with existing inflexibilities in those countries. America's 
new position in the world's economy favored a flow of 
gold to this country which weakened the position of a 
number of other countries and formed a basis for 
excessive speculation here. These and other economic 
causes for instability  were back of the  later financial 
disasters. They were responsible  in a large measure for 
the tremendous volume of short-term funds washing 
about the money markets of the world in defiance of all 
the ordinary rules except the rule of fear. 
It was against this background that the events of the 
years from 1931 to 1933 succeeded in generating an 
overpowering  psychology of fear  which became in itself 
a disturbing  element  apart from  its original causes. 
Fear, following the failure of the Credit-Anstalt in 
Vienna early in 1931, precipitated a crisis in Germany. 
Fear then crossed the Channel to England and forced 
the suspension of gold payments there. Fear of disas- 
ter here began to draw gold from the United States in 
vast quantities. As the focus of fear turned upon this 
country, it found to feed upon a banking situation built 
up very rapidly during the past three decades, when 
weak unit banks were allowed to spring up like mush- 
rooms all over the country. We know the results. When 
such fear takes hold of the imagination of the people, 
nothing will stop it until the structure itself collapses. 
No one who went  through the banking crisis of Feb- 
ruary and March 1933 will ever forget the irresistible 
rush of panic through the country. On February 14 the 
Governor of Michigan declared a state bank holiday 
and then in rapid succession one state after another in 
'U 
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Saturday, March 4, practically every state in the Union 
had  closed  its banks.  In the period of about  three 
weeks from February 9 to March 3, the people of 
America,  in fear, had  withdrawn  approximately 
$1,700,000,000 in money from their banks, an amount 
which equaled about 35 percent of the total money in 
circulation in  the country, even in the boom days of 
1929. 
We shall never forget the first three days  of March in 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. On Wednes- 
day, March  1,  in that bank alone,  we  paid out 
$51,000,000  of currency to our member  banks; on 
March 2 it was $80,000,000; on  March 3 it was 
$176,000,000. On that last day, March 3, we also lost 
$87,000,000 through  transfers  of funds to other dis- 
tricts, and $78,000,000 through gold exports and ear- 
marking. In addition, the public crowded into our bank 
corridors to withdraw gold.  In those three days, they 
carried off in bags, in suitcases, and in their pockets 
over $100,000,000 in  gold  coin and  certificates. The 
movement was cumulative. Each day was worse than 
the preceding one. This was a fear  which would wreck 
any sort of banking system. It was this situation which 
President  Roosevelt  must have had.  in mind  when he said 
in his radio address to the nation at the end of the bank 
holiday in March: "All we have to fear is fear  itself." 
I do not suggest that the collapse of the gold stan- 
dard in the early years of this decade was entirely due 
to international maladjustments  or to the psychology of 
fear  which spread through the world. We must also rec- 
ognize the effects of an increased rigidity of the inter- 
nal economic mechanism of many countries which had 
been developing  over a long period of time. The  impact 
of external forces, operating through gold flows, upon 
the internal economy of these countries had become 
much more painful than was formerly the case. It is not 
too much to say that this increasing  inflexibility has 
become the central  economic problem of our genera- 
tion, the root difficulty, whether one is considering the 
feasibility of international monetary stabilization or the 
problem of how to achieve and maintain economic sta- 
bility at home. Given a rigid internal  price structure, 
rigid costs of management and labor, there is danger 
that the international gold standard may have exactly 
the opposite effects from those which the gold stan- 
dard theory contemplated. Instead of correcting eco- 
nomic disturbance, instead of encouraging stable 
prices, the gold standard may then become the chan- 
nel of communication through which disturbances are 
transmitted around the world, bearing the germs of dis- 
ease rather than the serums of prevention and cure. 
I think this  becomes clear  if we bear  in  mind the 
fundamental distinction between rigid and state prices. 
A rigid price structure is a static thing in  a dynamic 
world. It resists adjustment, and so intensifies malad- 
justment.  Stable prices,  on the other hand,  are 
dynamic. The  ship and the airplane offer  no blind  resis- 
tance  to the winds  and  currents but move steadily 
through  them  by a process  of constant  adjustment. 
They move, they have a destination,  and they carry 
passengers and freight. 
Now, the increasing rigidity which we have witnessed 
has been cited by some as proof that an international 
monetary standard is no longer workable. That seems 
to me the shallow and short-sighted conclusion.  It 
ignores the great dangers and hazards of fluctuating 
exchanges as well as the competition  in defensive 
measures to which they lead. Financial armaments,  like 
military armaments, are expensive and unsatisfactory. 
Moreover, there is implied in this whole view the falla- 
cious notion that nothing more is involved than a mere 
act of choice; that we are entirely free to choose 
between domestic monetary stability and international 
monetary stability. It would be nearer the truth, in my 
judgment, to say that  neither is possible without the 
other.  Unless each country is  literally to build a wall 
around itself, our economic problem will always be one 
of interplay between internal and external forces, and 
no amount of choosing between fixed  or flexible 
exchanges will get around that tact. 
Maintaining monetary stability at home 
We are apt to think of the world as an abstraction, as 
something apart from the countries that make it up. If 
we get beyond this, we are apt to think of it as consist- 
ing of  some 60 countries, all mutually and more or less 
equally interacting upon  each  other.  It is perhaps 
nearer to reality to think  of the world as consisting of a 
few pivotal countries and their  economic spheres.  What 
happens to the world  depends primarily upon what 
happens to these pivotal countries. From this point of 
view is it not reasonable to conclude that the money 
question is mainly one of the impact of internal mone- 
tary conditions in these few countries upon the remain- 
der of the world? If these countries  could preserve 
monetary stability  at home, coupled perhaps with some 
safeguards against excesses of international  capital 
movements,  then fixed exchanges and gold flow would 
provide a means of imparting to the rest of the world 
the stabilizing influences developed and maintained in 
the pivotal countries. 
This approach focuses attention on the problem of 
internal control in the leading commercial countries. On 
it would depend the achievement of both internal and 
external monetary stability. There is, after all, nothing 
very novel in this view. Stated in homely terms, it sim- 
ply  means that we  who make up this group can do 
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houses in order. 
We in this country have already made some progress 
in  this direction. The dollar has been stabilized in 
terms of gold since February 1, 1934. We have main- 
tained the stability in relation to other gold currencies 
by the free purchase or sale of gold at fixed  prices. 
Furthermore, responsible officials of our government 
have indicated, in effect, that we are ready to consider 
international  currency stabilization  when other coun- 
tries are ready to do so. 
We  have enacted  legislation  designed  to avoid  a 
recurrence of some conditions which contributed to our 
own and to world difficulties. That is particularly true 
with  reference to the speculative apparatus which in 
the late 1920s drew funds to this market from all over 
the world—funds  which we did not want and funds 
which the rest of the world sorely needed. 
In  certain particulars  we  have amended  and,  I 
believe, strengthened our central  banking mechanism 
by giving  the Federal Reserve System additional 
powers of credit control, such as the powers to fix mar- 
gin requirements and to change reserve requirements. 
The exercise of these powers will call for wise judg- 
ment and courage. It must be admitted, however, that 
even though the powers of the Reserve System for 
dealing with credit problems have been increased, they 
are not complete in themselves, partly because other 
governmental  agencies  also  have vastly increased 
powers. The  System, therefore, cannot of itself assume 
final or full responsibility, at least not until some of the 
emergency laws dealing with monetary and credit mat- 
ters have expired or have been modified or repealed. 
These emergency laws not only divide  responsibility. 
Conceived in depression, they risk being real sources 
of danger in recovery. 
So, also, our commercial banking system, which col- 
lapsed under the strain of 1931,  1932, and 1933,  has 
been safeguarded in various respects. After the bank- 
ing holiday of 1933, only those banks believed to be 
sound were permitted to reopen, so that many weak 
banks were eliminated from the banking structure. Fur- 
thermore, a large number of banks have since joined 
the Federal Reserve System and are now under some 
form of national supervision through the Federal 
Reserve System or the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor- 
poration. The capital structure of undercapitalized 
banks has been restored through private subscriptions 
and through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. 
Resolving problems in the  domestic banking system 
In spite of these steps, however,  there are still some 
fundamental shortcomings in our banking system 
which, to my mind, must some day be corrected if we 
Allan Sproul, the third chief executive of the New York 
Federal Reserve  Bank, once referred to  central  bankers 
as "members of the silent service." George Harrison 
was the /east disposed of  all  the New York presidents to 
make public statements—in  fact, "Some Essentials of 
Monetary Stability" appears to be the only full-length 
address Harrison delivered during his term of office. 
Reprinted below  is a letter  from Harrison explaining his 
reluctance to give speeches. 
Mr. Walter B. French 
Chairman, Speakers' Committee 
Annual Convention 
New Jersey Bankers Association 
do The Trust Company of New Jersey 
35 Journal Square 
Jersey City, N.J. 
Dear Mr. French: 
Please let me thank  you for your letter of March 19 
through which  you were  good enough to ask me to 
speak  at the  annual  convention of the New Jersey 
Bankers Association, to be held at Atlantic City in May. 
I  hope I may be perfectly frank with you.  For years 
now, in fact  ever since I have held my  present position, I 
have made it a rule, with one unavoidable exception, 
not to make any  speeches. Many times I have been 
tempted to do so but I have always declined, not so 
much because of the burden of preparation as because 
I sincerely feel that I can  maintain currently a much 
greater independence of judgment if I am not commit- 
ted by some previous public statement. Whether I am 
right or wrong about this is not so important now as  the 
fact that I am afraid I would be greatly embarrassed if I 
were now to make an exception to the rule which I feel 
has kept me out of a good deal of trouble in the past. 
Some  day I may have  to change, but I will be most 
grateful to you if you will  understand my position and 
excuse me now. 
I attended a part of the  convention at Atlantic City 
last year. You were all so cordial and hospitable that I 
hope to join you again this year. I shall have to be in 
New York on May 12 for my regular directors meeting, 
but if I can satisfactorily arrange my plans, I shall cer- 
tainly be there the last two days of your convention. I 
shall look forward to seeing you at that time. 
Faithfully yours, 
George L. Harrison, 
President 
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Our commercial banking system grew up much like 
Topsy. At the beginning of the depression it consisted 
of about 24,000 separate unit banks, all organized and 
operating under 49 different sets of laws—the Federal 
law and the laws of the 48 states. Some of  these banks 
were members  of the Federal Reserve System but two- 
thirds of them were not. The Federal Reserve System 
was superimposed upon this heterogeneous group of 
banking institutions without any substantial change in 
the basic system itself. No central banking system can 
be made a substitute for a sound commercial banking 
system. So, while many steps have already been taken, 
we shall  not be able to boast of a wholly adequate 
banking structure until such time as it may be possible 
to develop a more unified commercial banking system 
with  greater concentration of both  authority and 
responsibility. 
This implies a greater uniformity  of banking  laws 
between the different states,  on  the  one hand,  and 
between the states and the federal government,  on the 
other.  It implies greater consistency and effectiveness 
of banking supervision, responsibility for which is now 
divided  among  too many agencies. It implies the 
necessity of improving the general character of bank- 
ing management through  the development of some 
more liberal  system of branch banking within appropri- 
ate areas.  It implies some satisfactory disposition of 
the knotty  problem of separating the commercial bank- 
ing function  from the savings  banking function.  The 
combination of these two functions in the same institu- 
tion has been one of the apparent causes of our bank- 
ing troubles of the past. Lastly, it implies the ultimate 
necessity of bringing all the commercial banks of the 
country into the Federal Reserve System. 
The precise answer to these questions is difficult to 
determine either  as to time or method. It will require 
thoroughgoing  and thoughtful  study,  and perhaps  a 
gradual solution; but we should not rest content until 
the problem  has been  recognized and its solution 
undertaken. I do not mean to imply that our banking 
system today endangers the economic stability of the 
country or the funds of its depositors. But I do mean 
that it will never function to the full limit of its useful- 
ness and safety until these questions are considered 
and disposed of in some satisfactory fashion. 
In this brief summary of some of the things which we 
have done in this country and still need to do in setting 
our house in  order, I have referred altogether to the 
financial aspects. To avoid misunderstandings, let me 
add this general qualification that the financial sound- 
ness of a country is not something independent from 
the soundness of its whole economy. It is not possible 
to have sound finance unless there is  also a sound 
industrial policy, a sound labor policy, a sound basis for 
the distribution of the national income, and a  sound 
governmental fiscal policy. To a considerable extent the 
financial well-being of a country is but the reflection of 
its whole economic life. So I have been discussing not 
the whole of the problem but rather that part of it which 
comes more within  the  direct  sphere of  the 
responsibilities of a bank of issue. One of the results of 
our complex existence is that responsibilities can never 
be wholly segregated and fixed. No question of grat 
importance in terms of human welfare can be narrowed 
down and dealt with in a single sphere. Each question 
is dependent somewhat on the other. 
It is obvious, therefore, that domestic problems will 
not solve themselves any more than will international 
problems. We should not be content to sit back and 
wait complacently for the solution. Each nation, while 
working for a removal of the international barriers to 
stability, might profitably direct its course towards 
domestic stability. 
As I say, we in this country have made some prog- 
ress, but we have more to do. The  same thing is true of 
others. Many nations have unbalanced  economies, 
drastic trade and exchange restrictions,  problems of 
relief and unemployment,  or budgetary difficulties, quite 
apart from political uncertainties. The  solution of some 
of these problems and the removal of at least  some of 
the existing obstacles to international trade might well 
be undertaken promptly in order to facilitate world  mon- 
etary stabilization. If these things are not done, if gov- 
ernments persist in stifling  international trade for 
uneconomic reasons, and if nations or whole groups of 
people over too long a period are denied the right of a 
decent standard of living  because of manmade barriers 
to the exchange of their goods and services, then, in 
the light of past history, they will seek  that right, some- 
times ruthlesly and by force, just as men have done 
from the beginning. If, on the other hand, nations now 
persistently and vigorously apply  themselves to a solu- 
tion of these quesions, then when the time does come 
for international  monetary action,  whether it be 
between large groups of nations or simply between the 
nations whose currencies  are the principal media of 
international trade, we can look upon whatever action 
is wisely taken with a fair degree of confidence that it 
will survive and contribute to the prosperity and happi- 
ness of peoples everywhere and, not least, to our own 
people. 
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